In a time of significant debate on ESG reporting regulation – e.g., the increasing worldwide adoption of IFRS Sustainability Disclosure and the Omnibus Package in the EU – this study investigates the economic consequences of mandatory ESG reporting, focusing on its impact on investors’ ability to monitor managerial behavior.
7 maggio 2025, ore 14:30
Campus Economico San Giobbe – Aula Murano
Disponibile anche online: https://unive.zoom.us/j/82820488988
Interventi:
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Marco Fasan, Venice School of Management
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Francesco Scarpa, Venice School of Management
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Claudio Soerger Zaro, State University of Mato Grosso do Sul (UEMS) – Campo Grande
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Elise Soerger Zaro, Faculdade de Administração, Universidade Federal da Grande Dourados (UFGD) – Dourados
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Paulo Henrique de Oliveira Hoeckel, Faculdade de Administração, Universidade Federal da Grande Dourados (UFGD) – Dourados
In recent years, numerous jurisdictions have been evaluating or implementing mandatory ESG reporting requirements, ranging from the adoption of IFRS Sustainability Disclosure Standards to regulatory updates in the European Union – which have intensified the debate on the economic effects of such measures. Contributing to this debate, this study investigates whether the introduction of mandatory ESG disclosure enhances investors’ ability to monitor managerial behavior. The study hypothesizes that mandatory ESG disclosure strengthens investor monitoring through three main channels: the scrutiny of ESG projects potentially affected by agency conflicts, the detection of ESG-washing practices, and the identification of opportunistic behaviors unrelated to ESG. To test this hypothesis, the study adopts the market value of cash approach and employs a staggered difference-in-differences (DiD) design, using a sample of 225,932 firm-year observations from 27,869 firms across 54 countries over the period 2004–2023.